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MONITORING: FUNCTIONAL OR FASHIONABLE?
DENNIS DE KOOL – ARWIN VAN BUUREN
An increasing stream of monitoring activities has entered the public sector. In the Netherlands there
are hundreds of monitors on a wide range, so it can be stated that monitoring is fashionable in the
Netherlands. But monitoring seems to be functional, too. Without monitoring, organisations would
not even survive. Research about the use of research information and evaluations makes clear that
information is not always used in a direct and transparent way. This statement raises three, interre-
lated research questions, which we try to answer in our paper: (1) What is the amount and the charac-
ter of (intragovernmental) monitors in the public sector in the Netherlands? (2) What forms of utili-
sation can be distilled and how are intragovernmental monitors used in practice? (3) How do these
functions of monitors relate to recent insights in the complexity of governmental performance and
the role information can play in complex systems?
The paper concludes with the observation that the current mode of monitoring is dominated by
rationalistic assumptions. Important functions from a complexity perspective, as learning and com-
municating, seem to be underestimated. Monitoring is fashionable, but it seems to be less functional.
Keywords: (intragovernmental) monitoring; complexity theory; information
1. INTRODUCTION
New Public Management and monitoring
The rise of New Public Management (NPM) is one of the most striking interna-
tional trends in public administration (Hood 1991). Its important elements of
NPM are the emphasis upon outputs and outcomes, transparency, accountability,
a shift toward more performance measurement and quantification (especially in
the form of systems of performance indicators and/or explicit standards), a shift
toward greater competition in the public sector, emphasis upon private sector
1588-9726/$20.00 © 2004 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
Society and Economy 26 (2004) 2–3, pp. 173–193
Dennis de Kool, Centre for Public Governance, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeesten
Oudlaan 50, Room M8-02, PO Box 1738, NL-3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail:
dekool@fsw.eur.nl
styles of management practices, and emphasis on service quality and a consumer
orientation (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003).
Alongside with the wave of NPM methods, an increasing stream of monitoring
activities has entered the public sector (Power 1997; Rossi et al. 1999). In the
Netherlands there are hundreds of monitors on a wide range. Monitoring has
grown up to a fashionable phenomenon (Engbersen et al. 1997) and to an instru-
ment with a big potential and a growing importance for the Dutch public sector
(Ministry of Home Affairs 1999). This development is stimulated by ICT, which
makes generating large amounts of information much easier.
Monitoring seems to be functional, too, from the perspective of the actor who
initiates it. It seems to be an important instrument to rationalise decision-making
and optimise goal attainment. Later on, we shall see that monitors fulfil different
functions. Although monitoring is considered important and the actual monitoring
practice is widespread, there is a lack of theoretical attention for this instrument
(Poister 1983; Vedung 1997).
Research about the use of research information and evaluations (Weiss –
Bucuvalas 1980; Beyer – Trice 1982) and knowledge-transfer (Glaser et al. 1983;
Krogh and Roos 1996; Kriwet 1997) makes clear that the (direct) use of informa-
tion is not self-evident. This statement raises the question in how far the informa-
tion of monitors is utilised. Are they, more or less, functional or are they only fash-
ionable?
Central question
In this paper we shall answer the following three research questions:
1. What is the amount and the character of (intragovernmental) monitors in the
public sector in the Netherlands?
2. What forms of utilisation can be distilled and how are intragovernmental moni-
tors used in practice?
3. How do these functions of monitors relate to recent insights in the complexity
of government and the role information can play in complex systems?
Research methods
In order to answer these questions, we combine different research activities and
methods (triangulation). First of all, we reviewed the relevant (secondary) litera-
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ture on monitoring and complexity theory. Second, we made an inventory to get
insight in the actual presence of Dutch (intergovernmental) monitors. Third, we
interviewed the key actors who are involved in monitoring activities in the Dutch
public sector.
Structure of the paper
First, we explore the notion of monitoring. We also formulate some theoretical as-
sumptions about its possible functions. Then we formulate some expectations
about the use of the information generated by monitors and the possible dangers
and challenges of monitoring. These theoretical findings will be evaluated by us-
ing notions derived from complexity theory.
Recently, interesting notions from complexity theory have been integrated in
strategic management literature (Stacey 2003); in knowledge-management litera-
ture (Griffin et al. 1999; Merry 1995) and in public-policy literature (White 2001).
These contributions enable us to make an extra application with respect to moni-
toring (see Section 2).
After, we give an overview of the actual presence (amount and character) of the
phenomenon in the Dutch government sector (on the national, regional and local
level), by presenting the outcomes of an actual inventory. Based on this, we shall
describe the main functions monitors actually play in practice.
Next, we confront the theory that is described in Section 2 with the practice de-
scribed in Section 3. Finally, we give some conclusions about the “modes of mon-
itoring” and the effect of this on the quality of the utilisation of monitor informa-
tion. Thereby we give some recommendations for the process of monitoring,
meant for increasing the potential usefulness of monitors (Section 5).
2. INTRAGOVERNMENTAL MONITORING:
FUNCTIONS, CHALLENGES AND DANGERS
Towards a definition
Monitoring is a complicated and wide notion that is interpreted in different ways
(Mayne – Zapico-Goni 1997; Poister 1983; Power 1997). For this reason it is nec-
essary to define the concept of monitoring. There are four features that character-
ise monitors:
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1. Monitoring is a systematic activity. That means that monitoring activities are
not ad hoc or incidental, but repeated activities which more or less standards re-
search-methods and indicators to measure developments.
2. Monitoring is, thus, a periodic activity (Poister 1983). Permanent monitoring
(surveillance) is not taken into account.
3. Monitoring is focused upon policy-relevant developments. The assumption is
that there are at least two measurement moments, t0 and t1 that can be com-
pared.
4. The result of monitoring is a description (ibid.). In most of the cases, this de-
scription has the form of a report. Sometimes, the result is a database.
Sometimes, monitoring is incorrectly confused with the benchmarking, policy
evaluation and policy research. Benchmarking is an instrument that describes and
compares different organisations at one moment (t0). Monitoring is, on the con-
trary, an instrument that describes and compares different moments (the differ-
ences between t2 and t1 for example). However, monitors can be used for
benchmarking purposes.
Monitoring and policy evaluation are also different instruments (Casley –
Kumar 1987). Policy evaluation is “the process of assigning a value or worth to
something” (Fischer 1995, 241). Monitors, on the contrary, do not in the strict
term of the word, contain normative judgements. Monitors can be used for evalua-
tions by the way.
Monitoring is also not the same as policy research, because policy research is
not always a permanent part of the policy process, while monitoring is. Further,
policy research is automatically scientific, monitoring is not.
We thus give the following definition of monitoring as a practical lead for this
paper: monitoring is the systematic and periodic scanning and describing of pol-
icy-relevant developments.
Motives for monitoring
In relation to the above-mentioned developments, the question can be raised how
to explain the use of monitors in Dutch public administration. The underlying
question is: why do policymakers need (more and more, as it seems) information?
Part of the answer is the fact that we are living in an information society in
which information plays a very important role. Knowledge and information are
the essential materials of the new production processes in our modern network so-
ciety (Castells 1997, 345). Businesses need information to improve products and
to compete with other businesses, citizens need information to compare products,
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and governments need information to make policy choices, to improve public ser-
vices. Monitors can be important sources of information. Of course there are a lot
of other sources for governments and policymakers. Examples are citizens, civil
servants, the world-wide web, newspapers, policy documents, letters, libraries
and so on. Information is the necessary prerequisite for organisations to survive in
today’s world (Mayne – Zapico-Goni 1997, 26).
We shall argue that the need for information (generated by monitors) is influ-
enced by four possible motives: the quest for certainty, the quest for control, the
quest for cognitive improvement and the quest for communicative dialogue.
These motives are partly derived from a literature study we did, and partly from an
empirical study on the functions monitors state to have. Based on these motives
we can also make a distinction between four functions of monitoring, respectively
monitoring as signalising, monitoring as steering and accounting, monitoring as
learning and monitoring as communication.
The Quest for Certainty
In his book, The Quest for Certainty (1929), Dewey speaks about the permanent
human desire to reduce uncertainty. Auditing (and monitoring) also arises from
the common human need to alleviate anxiety (Lee 1993, quoted in Power 1997,
122). By signalising developments and potential problems in the environment,
policy actors reduce surprises or get reassurances that there are none (Feldman –
March 1981, 176). Monitoring activities can make the complex reality visible to
policymakers and help them make “rational” choices (see also Simon 1976). The
first possible function of monitors is therefore signalising: certainty is derived
from an extensive scanning of the relevant organisational environment.
The Quest for Control
Controlling the physical and social environment is a basic human need (De Mul
2002, 60). Policy actors can try to reach these goals by steering (and accounting).
Steering is “to influence in a purposeful and sense making way in a certain con-
text” (Bekkers 1994, 21). Because steering and information are connected (ibid.),
monitors can supply the information which policy actors need to steer and influ-
ence the policy environment. Policy actors, however, can go too far in reaching
this goal. The book The Quest for Control contains a critique of the rational central
rule approach in public affairs:
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Under normal circumstances the rational-central-rule approach cannot work in the world we
live in. Its rationality is inappropriate because it is too far removed from ongoing forms of life
and from politics in particular. Because the steering centre lacks requisite variety its capacity
for learning is too small […] If the rational-central-rule approach can work at all, it can do so
only under special circumstances such as a reliable basis of knowledge, power and coopera-
tion and a stable field of application. However, in most cases these special conditions cannot
be brought about by policy actors (Gunsteren 1976, 150).
The second function of monitoring is steering and accounting. Control can be
realised by accounting and steering upon detailed monitoring information.
The Quest for Cognitive Improvement
Policy information plays an important role in policy learning and policy change
(Sabatier 1988). Evaluation can improve policymaking (Sanderson 2002). Moni-
toring can fulfil the same function. Monitoring can contribute to improved deci-
sion-making and ultimately to improved service delivery (Poister 1983, 208). The
third function of monitoring is (cognitive) learning.
The Quest for Communicative Dialogue
Monitoring is a social process in which actors with different frames of reference
are involved. The “rendezvous” function of monitors means that their information
is a base for discussions among different parties involved in the policy process.
The fourth function of monitors is communicating (Mayne – Zapico-Goni 1997).
Table 1 contains the four distinguished motives of monitors linked to their four
(possible) functions.
Table 1. Motives and functions of monitoring
Four motives for monitoring Four functions of monitors
The Quest for Certainty Signalising
The Quest for Control Steering and Accounting
The Quest for Cognitive Improvement Learning
The Quest for Communicative Dialogue Communicating
Challenges and dangers of monitoring
As we shall see, monitoring has become a common feature of the Dutch public
sector. It has become a common practice, widely spread over governmental agen-
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cies. This phenomenon does have both challenges and dangers. In our definition
of monitoring, we mention that monitoring focuses upon policy-relevant develop-
ments, and that monitoring is meant to support policy processes. So, when we look
at the value of monitoring, its challenges and dangers, we have to consider its
functions in policy processes.
Opportunities
First, monitoring can be seen as a chance, because measuring developments sup-
ply the policy actors with facts (feedback) and are aimed to reduce uncertainty. In
this way monitoring can contribute to improved decision making and ultimately to
improved service delivery (Poister 1983, 208). The improvement of performances
lies in line with the ambition of NPM. The wish of transparency is also in line with
NPM-ambitions.
By means of monitoring governmental actors can control the course and imple-
mentation of policy proposals. Information can thus serve as a mean to adjust im-
plementation strategies in order to improve goal realisation.
Monitoring can also serve as a mean to get people around the table. Monitoring
builds a concrete informational base for discussion between all the involved actors
in which results and performances are made visible. Communicating can become
the base for increased mutual understanding and trust between governmental
actors.
Threats
The “facts” generated by monitoring can be a goal instead of a mean: delivering a
(thick) report can become a powerful symbol of controlling and knowing the truth.
Monitor can become a “hollow” ritual without the ambition of improving policy.
Another danger is the fact that monitors can reduce reality to abstract figures.
To monitor reality, you have to make reality measurable. It is necessary to create
auditable/measurable performance indicators (Power 1997, 68). And that is very
difficult, so good monitoring systems are hard to design (ibid. 120). Another prob-
lem is the potential overload of information, generated by monitors. A normative
critique is that information generated by intragovernmental monitors can be mis-
used to enlarge the control of actors in disadvantage of other actors.
There is also a risk of perverse effects that are manifest in the performance par-
adox. At the core of the performance paradox is the idea that many measures run
down with use, they lose variability and hence the capacity to discriminate good
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from bad performance (Meyer – Gupta 1994). “Methods of checking and verifica-
tion are diverse, sometimes perverse, sometimes burdensome, and always costly”
(Power 1997, 1).
Yet another risk is that information can be misused (for example for strategic
reasons, or to enlarge positions at the cost of others). The result can be a lack of
trust and a lack of cooperation.
Summarised, when we try to connect these specific challenges and dangers to
the four functions of monitoring we have distinguished, we can compose Table 2.
Table 2. Challenges and dangers of monitoring, by functions
Function Challenge Danger
Signalising feedback (mastering) reducing reality to numbers;
right choice of indicators
Steering and Accounting transparency; improved performance paradox;
awareness of the importance domination, power struggle;
to realise good performance misuse of information
Learning factual insight in policy overload of information;
processes etc. reduced notion of reality
Communicating base for discussion and base for conflict and
cooperation which can result “fact-fighting” which can
in increased trust result in distrust (reduced trust)
3. MONITORING IN A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
In the previous section we described some key functions of monitors and the pos-
sible challenges and dangers of monitoring. Our evaluation of these possible func-
tions as well as the possible challenges and dangers of monitoring is based on a
more ore less “radical” perspective upon (policy processes and) the role of moni-
toring (in it), namely complexity theory (Stacey 2003; Griffin et al. 1999; Flood
1999; White 2001). We shall argue that, from a complexity perspective, the cur-
rent mode of monitoring emphasises hard values (rationalistic assumptions) and
pays little attention to the more soft dimensions of learning and communication,
which are highlighted by complexity theory.
First, we describe shortly the main characteristics of complexity theory, then
evaluating the findings of the former paragraph from a complexity perspective.
After presenting our empirical material, we shall give some conclusions about the
current mode of monitoring (based upon the acknowledgement that reality is com-
plex).
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What is complexity?
“Complex systems generally exhibit a number of attributes that make them more
difficult to understand and manage than simple and complicated systems” (Gallo-
pín et al. 2001, 225). From the many sources in literature, we can summarise the
most important characteristics of a complex phenomenon as follows:
– multiplicity of legitimate perspectives (the resolution of a conflict over com-
mon property cannot be reached without taking into account the perspectives
and interests of different stakeholders);
– non-linearity (the many relations in a systems are not linear – this generates for
example counterintuitive behaviour in a complex system);
– emergence (the whole is more than the parts: true novelty can emerge from the
interactions between the elements of the system);
– self-organisation (interacting components cooperate to produce large-scale co-
ordinated structures and behaviour);
– multiplicity of scales (many complex systems are hierarchic: systems are both
subsystems and supra-systems);
– irreducible uncertainty (non-linear processes; purposeful behaviour including
different actors or agents each with their own goal) (cf. Gallopín et al. 2001;
White 2001; Stacey 1995).
Additional characteristics of complex systems have been identified by Holland
(1995, quoted in White 2001, 246). He lists four properties he considers common
to all complex systems (alongside three mechanisms by which complex systems
operate, which we leave out of consideration):
– Aggregation (and recursion): Complex systems can be grouped into categories
that can then be nested into larger aggregates. A human being is a complex sys-
tem, but also acts as an agent in a larger complex adaptive system (an organisa-
tion), which forms part of a still larger complex adaptive system (the econ-
omy), and so on.
– Non-linearity: A given action can lead to several possible outcomes, some of
which are disproportionate in size to the action itself. Through multiple interac-
tions, organisations are capable of many responses that are complex and unpre-
dictable, leading to many outcomes.
– Flows (in networks): The agents of complex systems are connected by net-
works and nodes. These webs of connected individuals and/or organisations
are, or can be, connected in a non-linear way. They can give rise to flows,
which can lead to multiplicator effects and recycling effects.
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– Diversity: In complex systems there are wide variations and differences in their
structure and specifications.
In this paper we use a complexity perspective based upon the assumption that
the government sector is a complex phenomenon. This assumption is not further
investigated. However, it does not seem difficult to argue that complexity theory
offers a hopeful perspective for a dynamic, ever-expanding, fragmenting, compli-
cating public sector that has numerous types of multi-actor settings in it, lots of
differing actors with their own ideas, goals and roles, many forms of emergent or-
der, spontaneous informal rules within formal structures, etc. Governance, as the
process to which government, public agencies, private actors, citizens, stake-
holders and others give form, what we name “public policy” (Kickert et al. 1997),
can be seen as an even more complex phenomenon. White (2001, 248) argues why
complexity theory can help us by analysing governance as follows:
To summarize: it is assumed that today’s society is characterized by dynamics, complexity
and diversity, and it has been shown that the responses to this situation, such as partnerships
and multi-agency arrangements, are also complex. These organizational forms are dynamic
in that the composition of forces will result in non-linear cause-effect patterns of governing.
They are also complex in that they are configured as a network and have multiple and diverse
parts and the interaction between the parts is necessary in working on problems as well as so-
lutions. They are diverse, in that there exists variations, and differences in their specification.
Finally, in order that the governance system can respond to the dynamics, complexity and di-
versity of society, it must be capable of producing or reproducing its own organization and re-
producing its governance structures. That is, the emergence of organizations for governance
can be articulate as self-organizing.
Monitoring in complexity
In the rest of our paper we apply this complexity perspective to explore the phe-
nomenon of monitoring, in more detail. We cannot of course explore all details of
complex governance, but we shall present a couple of important notions, derived
from complexity theory, for our understanding of the value of monitoring. When
we confront complexity theory with the four functions of monitoring, then we can
make some important observations (Table 3).
The latter functions, learning and, especially, communicating, fits better in a
complexity perspective than the first two functions (signalising and steering).
However, we shall see in the next paragraph that most monitors in the Dutch pub-
lic sector fulfil these two functions. The dominance of rationalistic assumptions in
the current mode of monitoring is striking, especially when we confront it with as-
sumptions from the complexity theory.
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Table 3. Functions of monitoring from a complexity perspective
Function of monitoring Characteristic Reaction from complexity theory
Signalising Monitoring can help us Reality is inherently uncertain.
(The Quest for Certainty) reduce the complexity of Monitoring can only provide some
our environment provisional insights. Monitoring does
not give us certainty, at best some
more indicators about what we can do
Steering and accounting Monitoring can help us steer Reality is inherently uncontrollable
(The Quest for Control) in our complex environment and self-organising. Monitoring can
to a very little extent serve as a
control mechanism
Learning Monitoring can help us get Learning is especially a social
(The Quest for Cognitive insight into our complex activity, not very cognitive.
Improvement) environment Learning takes place in social
relationships, not by reading thick
reports
Communicating Monitoring can help us Communication is very important.
(The Quest for Commu- create mutual understanding Through interaction, novel or
nicative Dialogue) of our complex environment emergent, order (as trust and shared
goals) is created. When monitoring is
seen as a communication tool,
it can help organise reality
So far our theoretical considerations. We now present our empirical findings
on (the functions of) monitoring in the Dutch government sector.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS: INTRAGOVERNMENTAL MONITORING
IN THE DUTCH PUBLIC SECTOR
The phenomenon of monitoring
There are a lot of statements about the “assumed” amount of monitors in the Neth-
erlands. Albeda (2002) speaks about the “uncontrolled growth” of monitors. The
same statements were made by interviewed civil servants who spoke about the
“danger of uncontrolled growth and confusion” (interview, 10 September 2002),
who compared monitors with “mushrooms that grow everywhere in the forest of
monitors” (interview, 14 May 2003), stated that “of course there are too much
monitoring activities” (civil servant in mail, 10 July 2003) and spoke about “the
jungle of monitoring” (civil servant in mail, 21 October 2003). The problem of
these statements is that they are seldom based on facts.
In order to get factual based insight to the actual presence of the phenomenon
of monitoring in the Netherlands, we made an inventory of (intragovernmental)
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monitors in 2003. Before we present the results of this inventory, we explain our
method in more detail.
The first question is what (organisational level) actors are part of the inventory.
The Dutch government is divided into three levels: the national, the provincial and
the local level. In order to make remarks about the amount and character of moni-
tors in the public sector of the Netherlands, these three levels must be included.
Part of the inventory were national monitors (used by all the 13 Dutch ministries),
provincial monitors (used by all the 12 Dutch provinces) and local monitors (used
by the four big cities: Rotterdam, Amsterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. (There are
two reasons for not making an inventory of all Dutch local governments. The first
reason is that there are more than 500 local governments in the Netherlands. The
second reason is the assumption that monitors in small cities are also used in big
cities, so an inventory of all the local governments will probably not produce fun-
damentally different insights.)
The second question: How is the information about monitoring activities col-
lected? First, we searched on the internet. We visited the websites of all the actors
identified above and used the word “monitor(ing)” as a keyword. We combined
this activity with a document study. In a lot of cases we visited the libraries of the
actors to have a closer look in monitor reports. The strength of this method is that
it results in a lot of valuable and accessible information. The weakness is that there
is no guarantee that the monitors are still used (that is, whether the information on
the website is up-to-date).
For this reason there was a second scientific activity, which has the character of
a personal “check”. In most of the cases, a key actor was asked to check and criti-
cise the concept inventory. The question was: “Which monitoring activities are
undertaken by your organisation and/or by/to what monitoring activities is your
organisation involved?” The result is a list with “checked” actual monitors that are
used in the Dutch public sector. Let us have a closer look at the results now (see
Table 4).
Table 4. Monitors of the Dutch public sector in 2003
Level of government Number of monitors
Departments 336
Combination of departments 26
Provinces 136
Combination of provinces 4
Four big cities 225
Total 727
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What does this table say about the amount of monitoring activities in the Dutch
public sector? The number of departmental monitors means that there are 336
monitors in which a department gives order to undertake monitoring activities.
Sometimes a combination of different departments together set up a monitor (26).
The main conclusion of this table is that there are monitoring activities on all lev-
els of Dutch governments.
Intragovernmental monitors
Table 4 contains instruments that the public sector in the Netherlands conceives as
monitors. A weak point is that different actors may use different criteria and defi-
nitions of monitors. For this reason, the “long list” (presented above) is filtered by
using some unequivocal criteria. The result of this is a “short list” which contains
only intragovernmental monitors that comply with univocal criteria. These crite-
ria have to do with the distinguished four characteristics of monitors: systematic
and periodic activity, focus on developments and reporting (in report and/or data-
base). The fifth criterion is the question if monitors are intragovernmental or not.
Intragovernmental monitors are ones in which at least two different levels of gov-
ernment (policy actors) are involved. An example is the “Overheedsmonitor”
(environmental monitor), because in this case the national, provincial and local
governments exchange information.
Our focus on intragovernmental monitors has different reasons. The main rea-
son is a practical consideration. We cannot analyse in this paper more than 700
monitors. A choice for intragovernmental monitors, however, has some specific
advantages. One reason to highlight the intragovernmental dimension of monitor-
ing is that a lot of intragovernmental relations are problematic (Teisman 2001,
32). Cooperation is more the exception than the rule (Bekkers 2001, 289). This
makes interorganisational coordination (Rogers et al. 1982) and cooperation
(Aiken – Hage 1968) important. In this sense, intragovernmental monitoring can
support relation building between different levels of government. But it can also
result in increased tensions: “Mind your own business” is often heard when the
different governmental levels ask each other for (monitoring) information. The
“Bestuursakkoord Nieuwe Stijl”, signed in 1999, is an attempt to improve the co-
operation and trust between the three different levels of government in the Nether-
lands.
When we look at the whole list of monitors and the share of intragovernmental
ones in it, the image is striking (Figure 1).
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We can conclude that a relatively small part of the total amount of monitors in
the Dutch public sector contains of intragovernmental monitors. From the 727
monitors in the inventory, 24 are intragovernmental (3.3%).
In the next part of this section we have a closer look at the intragovernmental
monitors. Above we argued that monitoring activities in the Dutch public sector
are divided over different levels of government. An interesting question is if
intragovernmental monitoring activities in the Dutch public sector are also di-
vided over different policy areas. Table 5 will help us answer this question.
Table 5. Policy fields of intragovernmental monitors
Internal affairs and public management 0
Foreign relations and development cooperation 0
Defence 0
Justice and security 2
Education and scientific research 1
Public health, welfare and care 0
Social affairs 8
Housing, spatial planning and environment 7
Culture and recreation 0
Fuels and energy 0
Agriculture and fisheries 0
Economic affairs 2
Traffic, transport, communication and water management 4
Total number of intragovernmental monitors 24
The main conclusion that can be drawn from the table is that intragovernmental
monitoring activities in the Dutch public sector are not equally divided over dif-
ferent policy areas. The share of “social affairs” and “housing of the people, town
and country planning, and environments” is relatively high.
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Monitors
Intergovernmental
monitors
Figure 1. (Non)intragovernmental monitors
it r
Intragovernmental
monitors
The need for monitors: four functions of monitoring
Monitoring activities are part of the governmental quest for (policy) information.
We supposed that information from monitors could supply different needs. To put
it in other terms: we supposed that monitors fulfilled different functions. Figure 2
elaborates the functions that intragovernmental monitors fulfil in practice.
Note: n = 24.
Figure 2. Functions of intragovernmental monitors
The inventory of Dutch intragovernmental monitors made clear that monitors
in practice can fulfil one or more of the next functions: signalising, steering, learn-
ing and/or communicating. We have to say that we are speaking only about formal
functions. “Formal” means the functions or goals that are explicitly formulated in
the monitor reports (“formal” functions). This information does not give a definite
answer to implicit targets or functions (“hidden” functions).
Two conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the attention for “signalising”
and “steering” (accounting as part of it) is higher than attention to “learning” and
“communicating”. The second conclusion is that in most of the cases, intra-
governmental monitors fulfil different functions together.
Earlier we mentioned that monitoring give policymakers insight to develop-
ments and that it is a repeated activity. Figure 3 gives insight to the frequency of
intragovernmental monitors in the Dutch public sector.
The figure makes clear that the frequency of intragovernmental monitors in the
Netherlands varies from semi-annual to quadrennial. Periodical monitors are ones
with unknown or irregular frequency. We can also see that most of the intra-
governmental monitors have an annual frequency.
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Figure 3. Frequency of intragovernmental monitors
We will finish this section by making some summarising remarks.
(1) A lot of monitoring activities in the Dutch public sector are not only divided
over different levels of Dutch government, but also over different policy ar-
eas.
(2) When we compare the monitors in general with intragovernmental ones, the
share of the latters is relatively small.
(3) The four main functions of monitors we have extracted from literature can be
found in the practice of Dutch intragovernmental monitoring. The functions of
signalising and steering get more attention than the functions of learning and
communicating.
In the next section we confront our empirical findings with our theoretical as-
sumptions and statements.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have tried to answer three questions:
– What is the amount and character of (intragovernmental) monitors in the Dutch
public sector?
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– What forms of utilisation can be distilled and how are intragovernmental moni-
tors used in practice?
– How do these functions of monitors relate to recent insights in the complexity
of government and to the role information can play in complex systems?
In our “quest for monitors” we discovered some important things:
(1) Monitoring is a widespread phenomenon in the Dutch government sector.
Intragovernmental monitors form a minority in the great amount of monitors.
(2) “Signalising” and “steering” are the most common functions of monitors.
There is less emphasis on “communicating” and “learning”.
Although intragovernmental monitors can have a bridging function (building
trust and forms of cooperation) between governmental layers, their main func-
tions are signalising and steering. One of four monitors also has a communication
function. From a complexity perspective, monitors fulfil functions that have little
added value while the more potential functions are neglected. Increased mutual
understanding and building shared interpretations and ambitions are not therefore
promoted with the current mode of monitoring. In general, we can say that moni-
toring emphasises several things, which conflict with notions from the complexity
theory. We shall highlight three different characteristics.
Emphasis upon the measurable, controllable aspects of policy
Complexity theory emphasises the irreducible uncertainty of our world. Moni-
toring is meant to reduce uncertainty by making things measurable and controlla-
ble. But does it make sense to reduce uncertainty by focusing upon the sort of
things we can control? Are the more invisible things more important? Complexity
theory argues that we have to be aware of the intrinsic dynamics of our environ-
ment. Information has a very short lifetime.
Emphasis upon goal realisation
From our inventory we see that monitoring is frequently used as a measure to
control the implementation of policy programmes. When failures are detected,
changes are made. In complexity terms: monitoring generates negative feedback
that serves as input for policy changes. The focus is especially addressed to the
predefined policy goals. The question is: How do we do our job in terms of our
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earlier stated goals? But monitoring is not prepared to generate novel ways of see-
ing the world. Monitors do not facilitate creative solutions for unique problems.
But our understanding of the world is enriched when we look to it with different
perspectives.
Furthermore, monitoring enrich our understanding of what we (in essence)
know, but do not provide much opportunities to discover what we do not know.
Rigid control structures (as monitoring is) are optimally effective only when the environment
within which they operate is sufficiently stable that the organisation and meaning of the in-
formation both constituting and describing that environment behave predictably throughout
the relevant time frames of corporate decision-making, direction, control, and production
(Wytenburg 1999, 53).
Emphasis upon the product (the monitor) instead of the process
of monitoring
Monitoring activities are often focused upon delivering a monitor, a thick report
with all the (potential) relevant information. But in terms of complexity, monitor-
ing has to add to the learning potential of processes of information gathering.
Complexity theory emphasises the necessity of continuous learning, that is seen as
a relational activity. The intrinsic motivation of public servants to learn from mon-
itoring is the necessary prerequisite for monitoring information to become useful
knowledge. Monitoring is more part of the job of each individual agent. Their inti-
mate relation with the environment of an organisation provides more useful in-
sights than a centrally commanded information programme.
The goal of a monitoring process is not the report, but the process in which ac-
tors collect, interpret and learn from information, in which they interact with each
other, and in which they create new knowledge.
6. LESSONS, REFLECTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
In the current mode of monitoring we see a dominance of rationalistic assump-
tions in which complexity is ignored or reduced. The less rationalistic functions of
monitors, that fit better in a complexity perspective (learning and communicat-
ing), are under-utilised. We would like to argue that policymakers should pay
more attention to the “soft” part: communicating and learning. In recent literature
about policy processes, policy networks and governance, emphasis is placed upon
the notion of sharing information and communication. From a complexity per-
spective, these functions are the most valuable functions of monitors. Learning
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from information is a social activity and occurs in relations between persons. So,
communicating about monitoring information is much more relevant than writing
a thick report with very specific data. The process of “mutual sense making” can
be supported by monitoring, but only when monitors have a clear communicative
function.
The popularity of monitoring is a direct consequence of the dominant belief in
the value of NPM. “The hollowing out of the state by NPM generates a demand for
audits and other forms of evaluation and inspection to fill the hole” (Power 1997,
44). Coordination between subsystems in a complex environment, however, can
only take place when there is a mutual recognition that communication and dia-
logue will bring mutual understanding and will generate opportunities to realise
shared ambitions. A top-down monitoring programme can only work contra-pro-
ductively. Audits do not form a basis for communicating and dialogue (ibid. 127).
One of the central dilemmas of our present society consists of the ever-expand-
ing need to know in the neverending complexification of our society. These con-
tradictory developments lead to new challenges for public knowledge manage-
ment. Reducing complexity by trying to grasp it in a long list of possible relevant
indicators does not work today. The potential to get insight to our complex reality
lies in a joint effort of different actors with different experiences, bodies of knowl-
edge and interests (see Merry 1995). Monitoring can have a serving task, in mak-
ing communication and dialogue possible. In an open process of information gath-
ering and interpretation, whereby learning and understanding are more important
than control and correcting (Baets 2002), the real potential for monitoring lies.
Only then monitoring can become a functional fashion.
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